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TEVA AND THE PROCESS OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner*
Abstract
In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the Supreme Court
addressed an oft-discussed jurisprudential disconnect between itself and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: whether patent claim
construction was “legal” or “factual” in nature, and how much deference
is due to district court decision-making in this area. This Article closely
examines the Teva opinion and situates it within modern claim
construction jurisprudence. The thesis is that the Teva holding is likely to
have only very modest effects on the incidence of deference to district
court claim construction, but that for unexpected reasons the case is far
more important—and potentially beneficial—than it appears.
This Article argues that Teva is likely to have a substantial impact on
the methodology of patent claim construction. There are at least two
reasons for this. First, the players involved in district court patent
litigation now have an increased incentive to introduce extrinsic evidence
concerning claim meaning and to argue that such evidence is critical to
the outcome of claim construction. Second, the Teva opinion itself
contemplates a two-step process of evidentiary analysis in claim
construction: first an analysis of extrinsic evidence (fact), then an analysis
of the weight and direction of such evidence in the patent (law). The postTeva mode of claim construction in district courts is therefore likely to be
far more focused on objective, factual information concerning the
ordinary meaning of claim terms, or the ways that skilled artisans would
understand claim terms generally.
This Article further argues that these changes to the methodology of
patent claim construction are generally positive. By anchoring claim
meaning in objective evidence and following an established process for
evaluating claim terms, this methodology should result in more
predictability in litigation-driven claim construction, better drafted patent
claims in the longer term, and ultimately, a patent law that more finely
tunes the system of incentives it is supposed to regulate—all changes that,
if realized, should be welcomed by the patent system, most of its
participants, and the public.

* Lee Petherbridge, Ph.D. is a Professor of Law and the Richard A. Vachon Fellow at
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. R. Polk Wagner is a Professor of Law and the Deputy Dean at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,1 the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed an oft-discussed jurisprudential disconnect between
itself and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: whether
patent claim construction is “legal” or “factual” in nature, and how much
deference is due to district court claim construction decisions.2 The Teva
holding—that only determinations of extrinsic evidence (to the patent)
are owed deference under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and indeed, the scope of the claims themselves are subject to
de novo review3—has produced quite a bit of quickly-generated
commentary. A central feature of most of this literature is the expectation
that the case substantially alters the balance of institutional power in the
patent system by taking from the Federal Circuit at least some of the
power to decide the meaning of patent claim language.4
1. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
2. Id. at 835; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723
F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 13-854), 2014 WL 230926 (“Whether a district court’s
factual finding in support of its construction of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, as
the Federal Circuit requires (and as the panel explicitly did in this case), or only for clear error, as
Rule 52(a) requires.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted, 134 S. Ct. 1761 (2014) (No. 13854).
3. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.
4. For some commentary contending that Teva has substantially altered the balance, see,
e.g., Amanda Ciccatelli, Supreme Court’s Teva v. Sandoz Case Decision Has Big Impact on
Patent Litigation, INSIDE COUNS. (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/
02/18/supreme-courts-teva-v-sandoz-case-decision-has-big?page=2 (reporting that because of the
increased level of deference imposed by the Teva opinion, the case represents a “minor sea
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This Article closely examines the Teva opinion and situates it within
modern claim construction jurisprudence—and more importantly, the
incentives that drive claim construction results. The primary claim is that
although Teva does not substantially upset the balance of institutional
power in the patent system, for unexpected reasons, the case is far more
important—and potentially beneficial—than it appears.
To begin with, the Supreme Court’s resolution of how much deference
is due a district court’s claim construction decision is likely to have only
very modest effects on the incidence of deference to district court claim
construction, and therefore little impact on the balance of institutional
power in the patent system. Under Teva, (1) the ultimate conclusion of
the claim construction analysis is a question of law subject to full de novo
review on appeal, and (2) any analysis of the intrinsic evidence (of the
patent) relevant to the question is also a question of law subject to de novo
review.5 The subject matter of deference—information extrinsic to the
patent that nonetheless helps resolve an issue of claim construction—is
unlikely to be dispositive of the matter, at least absent efforts to
characterize it as such. Therefore, under the usual approach to claim
construction, the Federal Circuit will not lose much, if any, of its de novo
review authority, and will retain its role as primary arbiter of claim
meaning in the patent system.
And yet, Teva is still an important case, for a reason entirely
overlooked by the Court’s opinion: because it is likely to have a
substantial impact on the incentives that drive the methodology of patent
claim construction. This Article argues that Teva encourages at least two
significant claim construction behaviors that are likely to impact claim
construction methodology. First, the players involved in district court
patent litigation (the parties and the district court) now have an increased
change,” and “will lead to lower reversal rates on appeal from district court claim construction
decisions”); Dennis Crouch, Teva v. Sandoz: Partial Deference in Claim Construction,
PATENTLY-O (Jan. 20, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/partial-deferenceconstruction.html (holding that Teva is likely to favor patentees as compared to the prior de novo
review system); Nicole Fagin, Teva v. Sandoz: The New Standard Could Greatly Impact Patent
Litigation Strategy, TECH., INTELL. PROP. & PRIVACY REP. (Mar. 5, 2015), http://penntipp.org/
node/26 (“This holding has the potential to significantly change the patent litigation game, as it
makes it much more difficult for the losing party of a claim construction dispute to overturn an
unfavorable district court decision.”); Karen McDaniel & Michael Lafeber, Alert: Supreme Court
Modifies Appeals in Patent Litigation, BRIGGS & MORGAN (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.briggs.com/insights-publications-Alert-Supreme-Court-Modifies-Appeals-in-PatentLitigation.html (“The anticipated lower reversal rate resulting from Teva should make patent
litigation more predictable and affordable.”). But see Stacey Cohen & William Casey, 1 Year
Later, Teva Providing Less Certainty Than Expected, LAW 360 (Jan. 19, 2016, 12:50 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/651341/1-year-later-teva-providing-less-certainty-than-expected
(noting that over the past year, de novo review still plays an integral role at the Federal Circuit in
claim construction).
5. 135 S. Ct. at 835.
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incentive to push the locus of claim meaning from intrinsic to extrinsic
evidence, mainly by introducing evidence concerning claim meaning,
and to argue that such evidence is critical to the outcome of claim
construction. Second, the Teva opinion itself contemplates a two-step
process of evidentiary analysis in claim construction: first an analysis of
extrinsic evidence (fact), then an analysis of the weight and direction of
such evidence in the patent (law). As these behaviors become ingrained
in the jurisprudence of claim construction, the post-Teva mode of claim
construction at district courts is likely to be (1) more procedurally
structured and (2) (much) more focused on objective, factual
information—such as the ordinary meaning of claim terms, or the ways
that persons of skill in the art would understand these terms generally. It
is this attention to the process of claim construction that represents a
potentially significant change in patent claim construction.
After identifying this situation, this Article proceeds to argue that
these changes to claim construction—specifically to the methodology of
claim construction—are generally positive. By anchoring claim meaning
in objective evidence and following an established process for evaluating
claim terms, this methodology should result in more predictability in
litigation-driven claim construction, better drafted patent claims in the
longer term, and ultimately, a patent law that more finely tunes the system
of incentives it is supposed to regulate. These are all changes that, if
realized, should be welcomed by the patent system, most of its
participants, and the public.
The remainder of this Introduction describes the topic of claim
construction and explains its importance to patent law. A recap of the
history of modern claim construction jurisprudence follows, focusing on
the role central cases have played in its development. Part I explains the
Supreme Court’s newly issued Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc. opinion, dispelling possible misunderstandings and situating
the case in claim construction jurisprudence. Part II presents the argument
that Teva provides incentives likely to alter district court claim
construction. Part III offers reasons why the changes in claim
construction methodology identified in Part II can be beneficial.
A. An Introduction to Claim Construction
Every U.S. patent6 includes a “grant to the patentee, his heirs or
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing
the invention into the United States.”7 A patentee’s rights are thus rights
6. The term patent is used throughout to refer to a utility patent.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
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against the world—or at least that part of the world comprising U.S.
territory8—and as such, the rights confer on private individuals and
companies the power to privately regulate and shape the competitive
environment within and across industries. Not surprisingly, patent law—
the law surrounding the acquisition and enforcement of patents—seeks to
balance a patentee’s private rights with a corresponding public interest
that includes promoting innovation, removing impediments to
competition, and making new and useful information cheaply available.
To highlight just a few of the many possible examples of patent law’s
efforts to balance private rights with public interests: Patents are available
only for inventions that represent a sufficiently large technological leap
over existing knowledge.9 This feature of the law promotes certain types
of inventive behavior10 and at the same time suppresses rights-based
impediments to competition surrounding more predictable inventions.11
Additionally, patent documents are required to contain a description of
the invention adequate “to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make
and use” the invention.12 A purpose here is to ensure that the public, in
exchange for the cost of granting exclusive rights, immediately acquires
the ability to comprehend the invention and, once the grant expires,
retains the ability to practice the invention. As a final example, patent law
requires that each patent “conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
inventor . . . regards as the invention.”13 Patent claims define the scope of
the right to exclude conferred by a patent.14 The claiming requirement
directly evinces concern for the public interest, because by requiring such
precision in claim language, it seeks to afford the public effective notice
of the scope of the right.15

8. Accord id. § 271(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent.”).
9. Id. § 103 (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole
would have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains.”).
10. See generally Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1 (1992) (discussing the “nonobviousness” test used to qualify patents).
11. Id. at 13–14; see also Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 125, 125 (2012) (elaborating on the relationship between this aspect of
patentability and patent law’s best-mode requirement).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
13. Id. § 112(b).
14. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
15. Id. at 373.
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Central to these and to perhaps all of patent law’s efforts to balance
private rights with public interests is the law of claim construction. Claim
construction refers to the process through which the language making up
a patent claim is translated into a legally relevant context.16 If, for
instance, a claim defines an invention as having two elements that are
“coupled,” and an accused device having the two elements connects them
electrically rather than physically, the claim term coupled must be
construed to determine whether the claim defines only a physical
connection (in which case no infringement) or also includes electrical
connections (in which case infringement).17
That claim construction is central to patent law’s efforts to balance
private rights with public interests becomes even more apparent when the
examples laid out above are reexamined. It is what each claim defines
that is tested for validity, so a claim in an application or issued patent
must be construed—a patent examiner or a court must form a particular
and distinct understanding of claim meaning—before the claim can be
tested against the prior art to determine whether an invention is a
sufficiently large technological leap over existing knowledge to warrant
a patent grant.18 Similarly, the requirement that the patent document
contain a description of the invention adequate “to enable any person
skilled in the art . . . to make and use” is a requirement that the thing
defined by each claim be so described.19 Whether patent claims provide
effective public notice of the scope of the exclusive right—thus enabling
the public and competitors to arrange their affairs in such a way as to
avoid suits for infringement—depends almost entirely on whether the law
of claim construction is well understood and reliably predicts how courts
will behave.
In sum, the law of claim construction is of exceptional importance to
the patent system for at least three reasons.
The law of claim construction is the fulcrum upon which rest all of
patent law’s major policy levers. To the extent doctrines of infringement,
disclosure, and validity represent policy levers20—legal tools that courts
16. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Clam Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON LAW 123, 124 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
17. Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
18. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2103 (9th ed. Nov. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html.
19. Id. § 2164.
20. This Article refers to policy levers in loose reference to Dan L. Burk and Mark. A.
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1638–68 (2003) (characterizing as
“policy levers” a (nonexhaustive) list of patent doctrines that courts might use to make industry
or technology specific the application of the patent laws). While this use of the term policy levers
is not to emphasize the potential use of doctrines in the customization of the patent law for
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can use to balance private rights and public interests—their effective
application rests heavily on the quality and predictability of claim
construction law. If claim construction law is of poor quality and is
inconsistent, the social benefit of other patent law doctrines is almost
certainly diminished.
Claim construction is the most important issue in patent litigation.
Theoretical concerns aside, claim construction is highly contested in most
patent cases and is likely the dispositive issue in the overwhelming
majority of cases. This is because nearly every regularly litigated aspect
of a patent case turns on claim construction: whether claims have been
infringed, whether claims are adequately supported by disclosure,
whether claims are patentable over prior art, whether claims are
enforceable, whether claims define patentable subject matter, etc.—all
depend on what claims are construed to mean.
All patent system participants use the law of claim construction.
Patent applicants construe claims to ensure that they acquire the most
economically useful rights possible. The U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office construes claims to determine patentability. Private parties
construe claims to determine whether to initiate a lawsuit, to make
investment decisions, and to evaluate personal infringement risk. Courts
construe claims to decide disputes of infringement and validity.
It follows that the law of claim construction deserves close attention
and rigorous study.
B. A Recap of the Modern History of Claim
Construction Jurisprudence
The modern history of claim construction can be traced to the creation
of the Federal Circuit.21 Congress made the court the final arbiter of
patent disputes22 at least in part because it concluded that giving the
Federal Circuit such power would produce a clearer and more coherent
legal infrastructure for the patent system.23
particular trades, industries, or types of patents, it shares the meaning that patent doctrines perform
the task of regulating the patent system’s incentive structure. Also, the policy levers described in
Policy Levers in Patent Law are like those set out in the text above because their effective
application often rests on the quality and predictability of claim construction law.
21. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant
provisions codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
22. But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830–
31 (2002) (deciding that the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction does not extend to cases where
the patent law issue is not in the complaint and enters the case through the answer as a
counterclaim).
23. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 4–5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14–
15 (stating that the creation of a centralized court to hear suits related to patents will provide
doctrinal stability and as a result will decrease uncertainty and increase innovation). See generally
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Given the central role that claim construction plays in the operation of
all major patent doctrines, it is perhaps not surprising that the Federal
Circuit sought to clarify the judicial role in claim construction. In
Markman v. Westview Instruments,24 an en banc Federal Circuit held that
claim construction “is a matter of law exclusively for the court.”25 The
Supreme Court affirmed,26 elaborating that claim construction must be
conducted by judges, as opposed to juries, both because judges are more
likely to be better at the task than “jurors unburdened by training in
exegesis,”27 and because limiting interpretive authority to judges
exclusively was most likely to promote the goals of intra-jurisdictional
certainty and uniformity.28
In its affirmed Markman holding, the Federal Circuit reviewed the
district court’s claim construction de novo.29 But in cases that followed
Markman, some Federal Circuit panels appeared to be applying the clear
error form of deference to claim construction findings considered factual
in nature.30 In Cybor v. FAS Technologies, Inc.,31 an en banc Federal
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (1989) (describing reasons why the Federal Circuit was created).
24. 52 F.3d 967 (1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
25. Id. at 970–71.
26. 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (“We hold that the construction of a patent, including terms
of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.”).
27. Id. at 388.
28. Id. at 390–91.
29. 52 F.3d at 979 (“Because claim construction is a matter of law, the construction given
the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal.”); id. at 981 (“Through this process of construing claims
by, among other things, using certain extrinsic evidence that the court finds helpful and rejecting
other evidence as unhelpful, and resolving disputes en route to pronouncing the meaning of claim
language as a matter of law based on the patent documents themselves, the court is not crediting
certain evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings. Rather, the court is
looking to the extrinsic evidence to assist in its construction of the written document, a task it is
required to perform. The district court’s claim construction, enlightened by such extrinsic
evidence as may be helpful, is still based upon the patent and prosecution history. It is therefore
still construction, and is a matter of law subject to de novo review.” (footnote omitted)).
30. Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[B]ecause claim
construction is a mixed question of law and fact . . . we may be required to defer to a trial court’s
factual findings. Where a district court makes findings of fact as a part of claim construction, we
may not set them aside absent clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).”); see also Fromson v. Anitec
Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (distinguishing Markman and
appearing to use expert-introduced “extrinsic evidence in order to determine the meaning and
scope of a technical term as the term is used in the claims”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1555–56 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[R]ecognizing both the trial
court’s ‘trained ability to evaluate [expert] testimony in relation to the overall structure of the
patent’ and the trial court’s ‘better position to ascertain whether an expert’s proposed definition
fully comports with the specification and claims.’” (citing Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395)).
31. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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Circuit recognized the jurisprudential divide32 and—following its
understanding of Markman33—declared that claim construction presents
a “purely legal” question and is therefore reviewed de novo on appeal.34
Cybor thus confirmed the Federal Circuit’s plenary authority over the
claim construction issue.
With this authority now clearly in hand, the Federal Circuit—pursuing
its mandate to bring consistency and coherence to patent law—set to
work deciding how claim construction should be accomplished.
Comprehensive empirical studies examining the period following
Markman/Cybor have identified two methods developed by Federal
Circuit panels.35
The first has come to be known as the procedural approach. This
approach is notable in that it evinces a firm process that gives primary
weight to the general, commonly understood meaning that patent claim
language would have had to ordinarily skilled artisans at the time of
invention. This commonly understood, or “ordinary,” meaning of claim
language can be determined by express definitions included in the patent
specification, or by any number of objective sources including extrinsic
sources such as dictionaries and relevant scientific articles. Panels
applying a procedural approach hold patentees to this ordinary meaning
unless there is a clear, legally justifiable reason to depart from it. Johnson
Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Zebco Corp.36 is an example of an opinion
evincing the procedural approach.37
32. Id. at 1454–55 (“After the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman II, panels of this court
have generally followed the review standard of Markman I . . . . In some cases, however, a clearly
erroneous standard has been applied to findings considered to be factual in nature that are incident
to the judge’s construction of patent claims . . . . We ordered that this case be decided in banc to
resolve this conflict.”).
33. Id. at 1455 (“Nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion supports the view that the Court
endorsed a silent, third option—that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying
questions of fact.”); id. at 1455 n.4 (“If this were so, surely the Supreme Court would have
discussed whether subsidiary or underlying fact questions should be decided by the judge or the
jury.”).
34. Id. at 1456 (“[W]e therefore reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review claim
construction de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim
construction.”).
35. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2004) (“[T]he study
indicates that the Federal Circuit is sharply divided between two basic methodological approaches
to claim construction, each of which leads to distinct results.”). See generally Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 16 (concluding that the Federal Circuit has yet to resolve the split over
claim construction).
36. 175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
37. See generally Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 35 (discussing the procedural
approach); Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 16 (offering further examples evincing the
procedural approach).
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We begin, as with all claim interpretation analyses, with
the language of the claims. The general rule is, of course,
that terms in the claim are to be given their ordinary and
accustomed meaning. General descriptive terms will
ordinarily be given their full meaning; modifiers will not be
added to broad terms standing alone. In short, a court must
presume that the terms in the claim mean what they say, and,
unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the ordinary
and accustomed meaning of claim terms.
In order to overcome this heavy presumption in favor of
the ordinary meaning of claim language, it is clear that “a
party wishing to use statements in the written description to
confine or otherwise affect a patent’s scope must . . . be a
textual reference in the actual language of the claim with
which to associate a proffered claim construction.
Our case law demonstrates two situations where a
sufficient reason exists to require the entry of a definition of
a claim term other than its ordinary and accustomed
meaning. The first arises if the patentee has chosen to be his
or her own lexicographer by clearly setting forth an explicit
definition for a claim term. The second is where the term or
terms chosen by the patentee so deprive the claim of clarity
that there is no means by which the scope of the claim may
be ascertained from the language used. In these two
circumstances, a term or terms used in the claim invites—or
indeed, requires—reference to intrinsic, or in some cases,
extrinsic, evidence, to determine the scope of the claim
language.38
The second method identified in Federal Circuit opinions has been
labeled the holistic approach. The holistic approach deemphasizes
process. Instead, opinions expressing a holistic approach interpret patent
claims via an all-encompassing, open-ended reading of the patent
document that variably emphasizes the patent disclosure, prosecution
history, claim language, expert testimony, or relevant dictionaries. A
hallmark of the holistic approach is to disregard commonly held, artspecific understandings of the meaning of claim terms and to instead open
immediately with an analysis of the patent specification or prosecution
history. An example of the holistic approach can be found in Wang
Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc.39:
The parties agreed before the district court that the term
“frame” can in general usage be applied to bit-mapped
38. Johnson, 175 F.3d at 989–90 (citations omitted).
39. 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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display systems as well as to character-based systems;
experts for both sides so testified. The disagreement was as
to whether the term “frame” in the ’669 claims embraced this
general usage, or whether the term would be understood by
persons of skill in this field as limited to the character-based
systems described in the ’669 patent. . . .
....
The only system that is described and enabled in the ’669
specification and drawings uses a character-based protocol.
The specification mentions non-character-based protocols,
[but] . . . [t]he district court viewed the references to bitmapped protocols as acknowledgments of the state of the art,
and not as an enlargement of the invention described in the
patent. We agree, and conclude that the references to other
known protocols do not describe them as included in the
applicant's invention, and that the specification would not be
so understood by a person skilled in the field of the
invention.
....
Wang states that the character-based protocol is simply a
“preferred embodiment,” and that the embodiment described
in the specification does not set the boundaries of the
claims . . . . Although precedent offers assorted quotations
in support of differing conclusions concerning the scope of
the specification, these cases must be viewed in the factual
context in which they arose. Whether an invention is fairly
claimed more broadly than the “preferred embodiment” in
the specification is a question specific to the content of the
specification, the context in which the embodiment is
described, the prosecution history, and if appropriate the
prior art, for claims should be construed, when feasible, to
sustain their validity. The usage “preferred” does not of itself
broaden the claims beyond their support in the specification.
The only embodiment described in the ’669 patent
specification is the character-based protocol, and the claims
were correctly interpreted as limited thereto.40
Studies have shown that approximately two-thirds of Federal Circuit
panels use the procedural methodology, while one-third use the holistic
methodology.41 Significantly, these two methodological approaches are
often incompatible. Differences in methodological approach to claim
40. Id. at 1381–83 (citations omitted).
41. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 35, at 1177.
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construction were found to be present in 95% of claim construction
disputes between Federal Circuit judges,42 and 75% of Federal Circuit
reversals of district court claim constructions.43
After this internal jurisprudential divide had percolated for some time,
the Federal Circuit finally grasped the nettle en banc in Phillips v. AWH
Corp.,44 the self-professed goal of which was to “clarif[y]” the court’s
methodological approach to claim construction.45 The opinion for the
court endorsed the holistic approach for its focus on the context in which
claim terms are used. At the same time, the court criticized the procedural
approach’s reliance on the general, commonly understood meaning that
patent claim language would have had to ordinarily skilled artisans at the
time of invention as disconnected from the underlying technological
inquiry and more likely to be error prone.46
While the Phillips opinion endorsed the holistic approach and
criticized the procedural approach, it did not overrule or find error in any
of the court’s many prior opinions expressing a procedural approach to
claim construction—not even the one opinion that Phillips most squarely
criticized, Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.47 Quite the
contrary, the Federal Circuit instead emphasized that courts might use
any method to perform the claim construction task:
[T]here is no magic formula or catechism for conducting
claim construction. Nor is the court barred from considering
any particular sources or required to analyze sources in any
specific sequence, as long as those sources are not used to
contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the
intrinsic evidence. For example, a judge who encounters a
claim term while reading a patent might consult a general
purpose or specialized dictionary to begin to understand the
meaning of the term, before reviewing the remainder of the
patent to determine how the patentee has used the term. The
sequence of steps used by the judge in consulting various
42. Id. at 1144.
43. Id. at 1145.
44. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The Federal Circuit does not use the terms
procedural or holistic when describing its claim construction jurisprudence. The particular issue
in Phillips involved a discussion of the merits of the use of dictionaries as evidence of the meaning
that claim terms would have to the ordinary artisan, as compared to the specification and
prosecution history. Leading up to Phillips, the use of dictionaries had gained some popularity
(and drawn some criticism) after an earlier case from the procedural genre, known as Texas
Digital, discussed it favorably. See Tex. Dig. Sys., Inc. v. Telegenic, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1220
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
45. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.
46. Id. at 1319–24.
47. 308 F.3d 1193.
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sources is not important; what matters is for the court to
attach the appropriate weight to be assigned to those sources
in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law. In
[a notable earlier case], we did not attempt to provide a rigid
algorithm for claim construction, but simply attempted to
explain why, in general, certain types of evidence are more
valuable than others.48
A study examining the prevalence of procedural and holistic
approaches to claim construction following Phillips found that within one
year of the opinion, about two-thirds of Federal Circuit panels were again
using the procedural methodology, while the remaining one-third were
using the holistic methodology.49
Perhaps because procedural and holistic approaches to claim
construction are often incompatible, the hue and cry50 surrounding the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence did not subside after
Phillips. But after Phillips, the emphasis both from outside the court, and
to some extent within, turned away from facilitating a consistent and
predictable claim construction jurisprudence, and returned instead to the
issue of whether Markman and (particularly) Cybor were correct in
giving the Federal Circuit plenary authority over claim construction.
In fact, the issue was already gaining steam around the time of
Phillips. The order granting an en banc hearing in Phillips directed the
parties to brief, inter alia, the questions:
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116
S. Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), and our en banc
decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d
48. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (citations omitted).
49. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 16, at 128.
50. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6
(conducting a “comprehensive empirical analysis of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction
jurisprudence from 2000 through 2011. The data show that the claim construction reversal rate
has dropped significantly since the Phillips decision: from 38.6% to 25.6% on a per-claim-term
basis. The reversal rate on a per-case basis . . . has fallen from 41.8% prior to Phillips to 31.6%
following the decision. . . . Since Phillips, each Federal Circuit judge has become more likely to
affirm claim construction appeals than he or she was before the decision.”); Michael Saunders, A
Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215, 236 (basing his
study of claim construction reversals on Federal Circuit rulings from July 13, 2005, immediately
after the Phillips decision through September 13, 2006, “[t]he results indicate that Phillips has not
reduced reversal rates. Compared to the results of Chu’s study, the overall reversal rate in claim
construction cases, excluding summary affirmances, is 53.5%, slightly up from 47.3% for Chu’s
study. Similarly, the percent of cases where at least one construction changed is 39.5%, only
slightly down from 44% from Chu’s study” (footnotes omitted)).
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1448 (Fed.Cir.1998), is it appropriate for this court to accord
any deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction
rulings? If so, on what aspects, in what circumstances, and
to what extent?51
The Phillips opinion never addressed these questions but Judge
Mayer’s dissent left no question where he thought the flaw in Federal
Circuit claim construction jurisprudence lay:
Now more than ever I am convinced of the futility, indeed
the absurdity, of this court’s persistence in adhering to the
falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law devoid
of any factual component. Because any attempt to fashion a
coherent standard under this regime is pointless, as
illustrated by our many failed attempts to do so, I dissent.
This court was created for the purpose of bringing
consistency to the patent field. Instead, we have taken this
noble mandate, to reinvigorate the patent and introduce
predictability to the field, and focused inappropriate power
in this court. In our quest to elevate our importance, we have,
however, disregarded our role as an appellate court; the
resulting mayhem has seriously undermined the legitimacy
of the process, if not the integrity of the institution.
In the name of uniformity, Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc),
held that claim construction does not involve subsidiary or
underlying questions of fact and that we are, therefore,
unbridled by either the expertise or efforts of the district
court. . . .
Again today we vainly attempt to establish standards by
which this court will interpret claims. But after proposing no
fewer than seven questions, receiving more than thirty amici
curiae briefs, and whipping the bar into a frenzy of
expectation, we say nothing new, but merely restate what has
become the practice over the last ten years—that we will
decide cases according to whatever mode or method results
in the outcome we desire, or at least allows us a seemingly
plausible way out of the case. I am not surprised by this.
Indeed, there can be no workable standards by which this
court will interpret claims so long as we are blind to the
factual component of the task.52

51. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
52. 415 F.3d at 1330–31 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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In the ensuing years, the Federal Circuit made some attempts to
reinterpret the Markman/Cybor teachings,53 but none succeeded, until
finally, nearly twenty years after Markman, the Supreme Court granted
the petition for certiorari in Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA v. Sandoz, Inc.54
I. TEVA V. SANDOZ: WHAT HAPPENED?
A. Procedural Background
Teva and related firms own a patent directed to the multiple sclerosis
drug Copaxone.55 When Sandoz, as well as some other firms, sought to
market the drug, Teva sued them for patent infringement.56 Sandoz
answered that Teva’s patent claims were invalid, because, inter alia,
claim language defining the drug’s active ingredient as having “a
molecular weight of about 5 to 9 kilodaltons”57 was indefinite.58 The
reason Teva’s patent claims were indefinite, argued Sandoz, was that they
did not make clear which of three methods of calculation should be used
to determine the meaning of the claim term “molecular weight.”59
Consequently, according to Sandoz, the claims ran afoul of the statutory
requirement that patent claims “particularly point[] out and distinctly
claim[] the subject matter which the inventor . . . regards as the
invention.”60
At the district court, Teva’s expert opined that, although the
information in the patent allowed for at least three possible ways of
calculating—and therefore at least three possible meanings for—the term
“molecular weight,” a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention would understand the claim term “molecular weight” to refer
to molecular weight calculated by just one of the several possible
calculations.61 The district court credited Teva’s expert’s testimony on

53. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (reconsidering en banc de novo appellate review of claim construction); Amgen
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (order denying en
banc rehearing of de novo review opposed by four judges).
54. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 1373; Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Granted, supra note 2.
55. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v Sandoz, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 597.
58. Id. at 581.
59. Id. (“The crux of . . . Defendants’ claim construction argument is that the patent claims
are indefinite because the patents fail to specify the type of molecular weight being claimed or the
standards and conditions by which the claimed molecular weight should be determined.”).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
61. Teva, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
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this point,62 and concluded that Teva’s patent claims were not
indefinite.63
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s
indefiniteness judgment64 and concluded that the district court had erred
in concluding that some of Teva’s claims were not indefinite.65 Notably,
while the Federal Circuit reviewed the district court’s indefiniteness
judgment de novo,66 the form of review prescribed by case law,67 the
Federal Circuit’s opinion does not explicitly review the district court’s
construction of “molecular weight.”68
The lack of explicit appellate review and rejection of the district
court’s construction of “molecular weight” continues to lead to
competing interpretations of the analysis rendered in the Federal Circuit’s
opinion. The first interpretation, which represents the most direct reading
of the Federal Circuit’s opinion, is that the Federal Circuit took no issue
with the district court’s construction of “molecular weight,” but found the
claims indefinite after applying the law of indefiniteness. The second
interpretation, which lacks explicit support in the Federal Circuit’s
opinion but which might be implied,69 is that the Federal Circuit
62. Id. (“The Court credits and accepts all of Dr. Grant’s opinions . . . .”).
63. Id. at 588–94.
64. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The
court rejected the Appellants’ argument that the term ‘molecular weight’ was insolubly
ambiguous because it could refer to [multiple] molecular weight measure[s].”).
65. Id. at 1369.
66. Id. (“On de novo review of the district court’s indefiniteness holding, we conclude that
Dr. Grant’s testimony does not save Group I claims from indefiniteness.”).
67. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The
review of indefiniteness under U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2, proceeds as a question of law without
deference.”).
68. The Federal Circuit does devote part of its opinion to claim construction, but it addresses
different claim language. See Teva, 723 F.3d at 1373–75.
69. The argument that the Federal Circuit impliedly rejected the district court’s claim
construction might rest on three foundations: First, one might assume that when the law of
indefiniteness is correctly applied to the district court’s construction of “molecular weight,” the
claim must be definite. The Federal Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary thus implies that the court
understood the meaning of the term differently than did the district court. Second, although, as
noted in the text, the Federal Circuit’s opinion appears not to explicitly challenge Teva’s expert’s
opinion about the meaning a person skilled in the relevant art would ascribe to “molecular
weight,” the expert testimony is to the effect that Teva’s favored calculation is the primary one a
person of skill in the art would arrive at upon reviewing the patent. The Federal Circuit’s analysis
of indefiniteness is in tension with the expert opinion in that it (1) does not accept that the expert’s
opinion is dispositive of the indefiniteness inquiry, Teva, 723 F.3d at 1369 (“Dr. Grant’s testimony
does not save Group I claims from indefiniteness.”), and (2) seems to interpret evidence intrinsic
to the patent as creating more ambiguity in the meaning of “molecular weight” than Teva’s
expert’s opinion—interpreting the same intrinsic evidence—allows. Id. (interpreting Figure 1 as
“mak[ing] it difficult to conclude that [Teva’s favored calculation] is the intended measure.”).
Third, while claim construction and indefiniteness are clearly distinct issues in any patent case,
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concluded that the district court erroneously construed the term
“molecular weight,” and that when properly evaluated in the context of
the patent, the term is fatally indefinite because it does not allow a person
skilled in the relevant art to particularly and distinctly discern the
boundaries of the claim.
In its petition for certiorari, Teva argued that the Federal Circuit had
taken the second approach, phrasing the question presented thusly:
“Whether a district court’s factual finding in support of its construction
of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, as the Federal Circuit
requires (and as the panel explicitly70 did in this case), or only for clear
error, as Rule 52(a)71 requires.”72
The Supreme Court granted the petition,73 paving the way, after nearly
twenty years of practice, for the reexamination and possible refinement
of the Court’s Markman decision and its most famous progeny, Cybor.
B. The Supreme Court’s Opinion
In Teva, the Supreme Court held that the ultimate conclusion about
the proper construction of a patent claim remains subject to de novo
appellate review.74 This includes all evidence of claim meaning intrinsic
to the patent document.75 When, however, in the course of reaching a
construction a district judge examines extrinsic evidence to answer

they are very closely interconnected. See Cox Commc’ns, Inc. v. Sprint Commc’n Co. LP, 838
F.3d 1224, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Indefiniteness is, at bottom, an analysis of the degree of certainty with
which claims inform one skilled in the art about the boundaries of the patentee’s exclusive right.
Whether claims provide reasonable certainty about the boundaries of a patentee’s exclusive right
depends largely on whether a judge using the traditional tools of claim construction concludes
claims are amenable to a reasonably certain construction. The tight interconnection between claim
construction and indefiniteness might therefore also support the interpretation that the Federal
Circuit did review and reject the district court’s construction of “molecular weight.”
70. It follows from the discussion in the preceding text that the use of the term “explicitly”
in connection with the construction of the term “molecular weight” might have been somewhat
audacious.
71. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”).
72. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 1373.
73. Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted, supra note 2.
74. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837–43 (2015); id. at 841 (“The
appellate court can still review the district court’s ultimate construction of the claim de novo.”).
75. Id. at 841 (“As all parties agree, when the district court reviews only evidence intrinsic
to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution history),
the judge’s determination will amount solely to a determination of law, and the Court of Appeals
will review that construction de novo.”).
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factual questions subsidiary to the construction, the factual conclusions
reached are reviewed for “clear error” as prescribed by Rule 52(a)(6).76
The Court is explicit that the factual questions it contemplates as
possibly surrounding patent claim construction are genuinely
subsidiary—that is, that they will never be dispositive:
[I]f a district court resolves a dispute between experts and
makes a factual finding that, in general, a certain term of art
had a particular meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the invention, the district court must then
conduct a legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan would
ascribe that same meaning to that term in the context of the
specific patent claim under review. That is because
“[e]xperts may be examined to explain terms of art, and the
state of the art, at any given time,” but they cannot be used
to prove “the proper or legal construction of any instrument
of writing.” . . . “But in the actual interpretation of the
patent the court proceeds upon its own responsibility, as an
arbiter of the law, giving to the patent its true and final
character and force” (quoting 2 W. Robinson, Law of
Patents § 732, pp. 482–483 (1890); emphasis in original)).77
The Court is similarly explicit in its conclusion that “subsidiary
factfinding is unlikely to loom large in the universe of litigated claim
construction.”78
Because the ultimate conclusion about the proper construction of a
patent claim is a purely legal one subject to de novo review, and because
any subsidiary factual finding involved in a district court’s claim
construction cannot override interpretive findings based on evidence
intrinsic to the patent document—conclusions that are also reviewed de
novo—it seems unlikely that Teva will have anything more than a modest
impact on the incidence of appellate deference to district court claim
construction.
It thus appears that Teva changes very little of the Markman/Cybor
approach to claim construction,79 and should be considered a relatively
unimportant case from that perspective. As the following Part sets out,
76. Id. (“These are the ‘evidentiary underpinnings’ of claim construction that we discussed
in Markman, and this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal.”).
77. Id. (alteration in original).
78. Id. at 840.
79. The few Federal Circuit opinions following Teva appear consistent with this
interpretation. See, e.g., Shire Dev., LLC. v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (rejecting the argument that deference is owed to expert testimony); see also Jason
Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 430, 436, 442
(2015) (arguing that in post-Teva cases the Federal Circuit has regularly refused deference to
district court claim construction). But see Va. Innovation Scis., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 614
F. App’x 503, 511 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (deciding that extrinsic evidence must be consulted).
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however, there is reason to think, for perhaps unexpected reasons, that
Teva is potentially a much more important case than it appears.
II. THE (HIDDEN) SIGNIFICANCE OF TEVA
As noted above, the question discussed and answered in Teva is
limited to the proper form of appellate review for district court claim
construction. For the reasons just discussed, the Supreme Court’s answer
to the question of the proper form of review is unlikely to have a large
impact on the quantity of appellate deference to district court claim
construction. Nevertheless, Teva may still prove an important case.
The reason is one entirely overlooked by the Court’s opinion: The
case is likely to have a substantial impact on the incentives that drive the
methodology of patent claim construction. This Part argues that Teva
encourages at least two behaviors that are likely to impact claim
construction methodology. First, the players involved in district court
patent litigation (the district courts and parties) now have an increased
incentive to push the locus of claim construction analysis towards
extrinsic evidence and away from intrinsic evidence. Second, and
following from the first, the Teva opinion itself contemplates a two-step
process of evidentiary analysis in claim construction: first an analysis of
extrinsic evidence (fact), then an analysis of the weight and direction of
such evidence in the patent (law).
As these behaviors become common, the post-Teva mode of claim
construction in district courts is likely to be somewhat procedurally
structured and far more focused on objective, factual information—such
as the ordinary meaning of claim terms, or the ways that persons of skill
in the art would understand these terms generally. It follows that with this
additional focus will come a more rigorous attention to the process of
claim construction—where the line between extrinsic and intrinsic
evidence lies, and how extrinsic evidence should be understood in the
context of the patent.
A. Changed Incentives
Prior to Teva, factual findings based on expert testimony were
disfavored in the analysis of claim construction.80 Teva changes this.
Even though the ultimate claim construction question—and the
interpretation of intrinsic evidence, and the meaning of common terms,
and more—is to be reviewed de novo, this form of extrinsic evidence may
now plainly be used to shape claim construction outcomes.81
80. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Which is not to say
expert testimony was impermissible when it came to claim construction. It was (and is) possible
under Federal Circuit law for courts to hear from experts in the context of claim construction.
81. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 833.
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As the Supreme Court observed:
In some instances, a factual finding will play only a small
role in a judge’s ultimate legal conclusion about the meaning
of the patent term. But in some instances, a factual finding
may be close to dispositive of the ultimate legal question of
the proper meaning of the term in the context of the patent.82
The “factual finding[s]” the Court refers to are the extrinsic evidencebased subsidiary factual findings discussed earlier. The Court clearly
envisions that such factual findings may canalize district court claim
constructions, and in fact may be highly influential. As explained earlier,
Teva holds that a reviewing court is to accept these potentially “close to
dispositive” factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.83
We think that these changes—allowing extrinsic evidence-based fact
finding to influence claim construction outcomes and requiring appellate
deference to such fact finding—enlarge the incentive that the players
involved in district court patent litigation (the district courts and parties)
have to introduce extrinsic evidence concerning claim meaning and to
argue that such evidence is critical to the outcome of claim construction.
One reason such an incentive exists for district courts is that district
courts may reasonably expect that making claim construction depend on
extrinsic evidence-based factual findings will conserve that court’s
(judicial) resources. The intuition here is that a claim construction that
depends on factual findings made from extrinsic evidence will, after
Teva, be less likely to be reversed by the Federal Circuit than a claim
construction that does not do so. Because, as discussed earlier,84 claim
construction is so central to the application of virtually all litigated patent
doctrines, appellate acceptance of a district court’s claim construction
substantially improves the likelihood that the district court’s entire
judgment will be affirmed. District courts can therefore reasonably expect
that making a claim construction depend on extrinsic evidence-based
factual findings should bring a patent case to a more rapid—and thus less
costly—close. As it is generally safe to assume that district courts (and
other courts too, for that matter) wish to decide cases as efficiently as
possible, it follows that district courts have an incentive to rely on
extrinsic evidence of claim meaning.85
82. Id. at 841–42.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
85. The discerning reader will appreciate that this analysis raises some questions suitable
for future empirical analysis. One such question is whether patent cases will really get cheaper for
district courts if they emphasize extrinsic evidence concerning claim meaning and are more often
affirmed on appeal. It is difficult to say for sure, and district judges will likely, consciously or
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The parties to district court patent litigation also have an enlarged
incentive, following Teva, to introduce extrinsic evidence concerning
claim meaning and to argue that such evidence is critical to the outcome
of claim construction.
One reason why is that Teva affords parties greater strategic flexibility
in patent cases. Prior to Teva, parties needed to focus their arguments
over the meaning of claim terms and the proper construction of patent
claims on the patent document only.86 That is, on the evidence intrinsic
to the patent: the claims, specification, and to a lesser extent, the
prosecution history. After Teva, parties have the incentive to introduce
extrinsic evidence and make arguments about its role in claim
construction, as well as make arguments based on the intrinsic evidence.
The party that wins in the district court can be expected to emphasize that
findings made from the extrinsic evidence were critical to the district
court’s construction. The party that loses will presumably contend that
the factual findings were clearly erroneous, and in any event cannot be
reconciled with intrinsic evidence that shows how a skilled artisan would
understand the term “in the context of the specific patent claim under
review.”87 The strategic flexibility offered by the use of extrinsic
evidence—in effect, an additional alternative argument favoring a
preferred claim construction—should be appealing to lawyers because it
logically offers more chances at winning—or not losing—a case.
Another reason parties will be encouraged to introduce extrinsic
evidence and to argue that such evidence is critical to the outcome of
claim construction is because Teva suggests that judgments based on
extrinsic evidence are more likely to be sustained on appeal. The Teva
court observes that extrinsic evidence-based fact finding should at least
sometimes be “close to dispositive” of claim meaning,88 and Teva
requires appellate courts to give such fact finding deferential review.89 It
is thus reasonable to expect that if parties can secure favorable judgments
from district courts that emphasize the importance of subsidiary fact
finding to the ultimate construction of patent claims, such judgments
should be at least somewhat more likely to be sustained on appeal. The
expectation of greater procedural certainty should be attractive to
attorneys and their clients because it increases the value of favorable
judgments and improves leverage in subsequent negotiations.90
otherwise, account for whatever extra costs are entailed by the greater use of extrinsic evidence
in claim construction, but enough patent scholars and observers appear to believe so that we think
it fair to say that there is a felt consensus that the answer is “yes.”
86. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 835.
87. Id. at 841.
88. Id. at 841–42.
89. Id. at 842.
90. On the losing side, it may also offer better information about whether to continue or
settle a case.
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Yet another reason why parties to district court patent litigation should
be expected to introduce extrinsic evidence of claim meaning more often
post-Teva is that, generally speaking, it is going to be in lawyers’ interests
to do so.
This argument draws on several points, some of which have already
been established. To begin with, judges have an enlarged incentive to rely
on extrinsic evidence concerning claim meaning and to argue that such
evidence is critical to the outcome of claim construction. That judges are
likely to prefer deciding claim constructions in a manner that emphasizes
the importance of extrinsic evidence creates an incentive for parties to
offer a means of satisfying that preference in a way that aligns with the
parties’ own goals for the case. The incentive to gain advantage in a case
by satisfying judicial preferences for certain types of evidence and
argument amplifies the already strong incentives—tactical flexibility and
the higher probability that a favorable judgment is sustained on appeal—
that parties have to rely on extrinsic evidence of claim meaning.
Parties’ robust incentive to introduce and rely on extrinsic evidence of
claim meaning so far discussed may be compounded by the fact that if
one party to a case succumbs to the incentive, the other party might
conclude that it is necessary to respond in kind. Failing to do so not only
leaves a potentially dispositive argument out of the case; it leaves out the
sort of argument that might be the most attractive to the judge. In failing
to introduce an extrinsic evidence-based argument, a party also fails to
offer an alternative to an opposing factual presentation and misses an
opportunity for fact-based advocacy. Many lawyers may not want to miss
these opportunities and may feel compelled to include in patent cases
extrinsic evidence of claim meaning.
Finally, it must be noted that the additional litigation encouraged by
Teva offers the possibility of additional fees for lawyers. As it is natural
for lawyers to attempt to earn as much as possible, it seems inevitable
that patent lawyers will begin to counsel clients that it is necessary to take
on the extra costs of introducing extrinsic evidence concerning claim
meaning and arguing that such evidence is critical to the outcome of claim
construction.
In sum, it is reasonable to think that post-Teva, the parties to district
court patent litigation have a sizeable incentive to introduce and rely on
extrinsic evidence of claim meaning.
B. The Development of Process
The incentives just developed are likely to encourage the broad
appearance of a particular methodology of claim construction in patent
cases. The methodology likely to emerge will take the form of a process
by which claim construction will often be accomplished.
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The reasons underlying this argument are straightforward. To begin
with, as discussed above, parties will have robust incentives to introduce
extrinsic evidence of claim meaning and to argue that such evidence is
critical to the outcome of claim construction.
Next, Teva is clear that for a large set of patent claim terms there are
two legally relevant meanings that relate in a way that suggests the
development of a process for assessing claim meaning.
The first is the “general . . . meaning to a person of ordinary skill in
the art at the time of the invention.”91 The court may determine this
meaning from extrinsic evidence, and that conclusion is either a “factual
finding” or, if not, very closely bound to the “factual finding[s]” for
which Teva requires appellate deference.92
But once the district court has established this general meaning, it
“must then conduct a legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan would
ascribe that same meaning to that term in the context of the specific patent
claim under review,”93 to arrive at the second, and ultimate, meaning of
the claim term. The determination of this second meaning is an act of
construction, and is, according to Teva, a question of law that is reviewed
de novo.94 The second meaning can therefore “overrule” the first, general
meaning, but it appears that it should not unless “the context of the
specific patent claim under review”—mainly the intrinsic evidence—
shows that a person of skill in the art would not “ascribe that same
meaning to that term.”95
Under this rather straightforward reading of Teva, it would seem that
in cases in which a general, or ordinary, meaning of patent claim language
is found to have existed at the time of invention, that meaning is, in an
important sense, presumably the correct one, although it can be displaced
if it conflicts with the intrinsic evidence.
Keeping all this in mind, the process we expect to emerge at the
district courts may look much like this:
(1) Parties will seek to introduce extrinsic evidence concerning the
general meaning that patent claim language would have had to ordinarily
skilled artisans at the time of invention, and argue that it is critical to the
outcome of claim construction.
(2) The district court will consider this evidence and argument, and
the district judge may make factual findings concerning the general
meaning of claim terms at the time of invention.
(3) The district court will examine the claims, specification, and to a
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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lesser extent the prosecution history to ascertain whether the general (at
the time of invention) meaning is the same meaning “a skilled artisan
would ascribe . . . in the context of the specific patent claim under
review.”96
(4) If the answer is “yes,” the district court will likely craft an order
explaining the importance of the extrinsic evidence and further
explaining how the intrinsic evidence comports with the conclusion. If
the answer is “no,” the district judge will have an incentive to explain
why not, and given the structure of the analysis so far described, that will
probably require explaining how the ordinary meaning of the claim
terms—determined perhaps in part from extrinsic evidence—are
“overruled” by the intrinsic evidence.97
As district courts offer, and the Federal Circuit reviews, reasons why
intrinsic evidence overrules (or not) extrinsic evidence establishing the
meaning that claim terms had to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention, the Federal Circuit will likely reject some reasons,
accept others, and elaborate its own.98 These precedents will further
define legal justifications for departing from a claim term’s ordinary
meaning at the time of invention, and naturally feed back on district court
decision-making, reinforcing the process Teva’s incentives encourage.
Another significant feature of the process Teva encourages is that, in
practice, it implies a presumption. Because the touchstone of claim
construction is the meaning a term would have to a person of ordinary
skill in the art at the time of invention,99 and because the role of extrinsic
evidence-based fact-finding is to support that particular determination in
general terms,100 the extrinsic evidence-supported “meaning of a term in
the relevant art”101 is arguably the correct meaning of the term until “the
96. Id.
97. It should be clear that this procedure includes the possibility that a district judge might
sometimes decide to waive consideration of otherwise competent extrinsic evidence that conflicts
with a claim definition a judge favors that is based on only intrinsic evidence. In such cases, we
think it will be natural for a judge to think it necessary to explain why the idiosyncratic definition
from the intrinsic evidence is superior to the ordinary meaning of the term. This sort of judicial
behavior is synonymous with the process described here.
98. The Federal Circuit has developed several of these already in connection with its
proceduralist approach to claim construction. See, e.g., infra note 104 and accompanying text.
99. This is the touchstone of claim construction. See Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari
Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“A court construing a patent
claim seeks to accord a claim the meaning it would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the invention.”); see also Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841 (acknowledging that extrinsic
evidence will sometimes need to be consulted to “understand . . . the meaning of a term in the
relevant art during the relevant time period”).
100. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.
101. Id.
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context of the specific patent claim under review”102 can show why the
art-specific meaning should be adjusted to one idiosyncratic to the patent.
If this approach to claim construction looks familiar, that is because it
is very similar to the proceduralist approach to claim construction used
by a majority of Federal Circuit panels since Markman. Described earlier,
that approach involves determining the general, commonly understood
meaning that patent claim language would have had to ordinarily skilled
artisans at the time of invention and heavily presuming103 that this
“ordinary” meaning is the controlling one unless there is a legally
justifiable reason to depart from it. Case law across the last two decades
has developed legally justifiable reasons to depart, almost all founded on
the public-notice function of intrinsic evidence.104 Thus, generally
speaking, under a procedural approach claim terms are construed to have
the meaning they would have had to a person of ordinary skill in the art
at the time of the invention “unless the patentee unequivocally imparted
a novel meaning to those terms or expressly relinquished claim scope
during prosecution.”105
The procedural approach, moreover, has always contained a role for
extrinsic evidence:
The inquiry into the meaning that claim terms would have to
a person of skill in the art at the time of the invention is an
objective one. This being the case, a court looks to those
sources available to the public that show what a person of
skill in the art would have understood disputed claim
language to mean. Those sources include the words of the
claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the
102. Id.
103. Federal Circuit claim construction jurisprudence has long contained a “heavy
presumption” in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim terms. See, e.g., Mass. Inst. of Tech. v.
Shire Pharm., Inc., 839 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 856–57 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp.,
175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
104. Some cases recognize that a patentee might explicitly define a term in a patent. See,
e.g., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“[P]atent law allows
the inventor to be his own lexicographer.”). Others observe that a patentee might clearly state in
a patent that described embodiment as the only possible embodiment of the invention. See, e.g.,
Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 905–09 (Fed. Cir. 2004); SciMed Life Sys.,
Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating, in the
written description, “[the] structure . . . is ‘the basic . . . structure for all embodiments’”); Watts
v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 883 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating, in the written description, “[t]he
present invention utilizes [the] feature”); see also Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d
1314, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (requiring clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope
during prosecution in order to overcome the “heavy presumption” that claim terms carry their
ordinary and accustomed meaning).
105. Omega Eng’g, Inc., 334 F.3d at 1323.
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prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning
relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms,
and the state of the art.106
Of course, before Teva, the resolution of factual disputes involving
extrinsic evidence was fully encompassed within the judicial act of
document construction, as Markman suggested, and thus fell within an
appellate court’s de novo review of claim construction.107 Nevertheless,
even when all of claim construction was reviewed de novo, a majority of
Federal Circuit panels used an approach to claim construction that often
utilized—and always permitted—the use of extrinsic evidence to answer
a fundamental question of claim construction: the ordinary meaning of a
term to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.108
Moreover, the panels that approach claim construction this way treat the
ordinary meaning as controlling, subject only to an investigation of any
idiosyncrasies that might surround a claim term’s use in the patent.
The basic point here is that the process for establishing claim meaning
encouraged by Teva aligns well with what a majority of Federal Circuit
panels have done since Markman. Federal Circuit jurisprudence therefore
already contains a procedure for determining claim meaning that is easily
adaptable to the incentives provided by Teva. The existence of a path of
least resistance may serve to further inculcate the process.
In sum, therefore, the argument is that Teva can encourage the broad
appearance in patent cases of the methodology of claim construction
described above. In the interest of avoiding any confusion, however, it
must be clear that the argument is not that Teva requires the use of this
process in every case. For example, in some cases, a patent’s
idiosyncratic definition of a claim term will be clear from the intrinsic
evidence—perhaps, for example, when a patent applicant includes an
express definition in the specification or clearly establishes a relevant
limit to meaning in the prosecution history. In others, the meaning of a
disputed claim term to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of
the invention might be accessible to a court because the term is a simple
one—for example, “or,” “and,” or “connector”—and does not leave much
106. See, e.g., Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111,
1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
107. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454–56 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
108. For example, many courts use dictionaries during claim construction. See Union
Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(“Although technically a form of extrinsic evidence, dictionaries hold a special place in claim
construction . . . .”); see also Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[C]onsultation of extrinsic evidence is particularly appropriate to ensure that
[the judge’s] understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is not entirely at variance with
the understanding of one skilled in the art.”).
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room for the argument that the term had a special technical meaning to
skilled artisans at the time of invention.109
As most of those familiar with the patent system already know,
however, it is usually not the case for litigated patents that the intrinsic
evidence unambiguously shows the meaning of claim terms. The intrinsic
evidence more commonly allows both parties to develop plausible (and
conflicting) definitions for claim terms and offers courts few tools to
fairly distinguish between the two. Judge Mayer acknowledged this fact
in his Phillips dissent, which argues that claim construction cannot be
fairly accomplished as long as appellate courts are “blind to the factual
component of the task,”110 and that for this reason Federal Circuit claim
constructions “resemble reality, if at all, only by chance.”111 This fact
might also help to explain why roughly two-thirds of Federal Circuit
panels have already opted for an approach to claim construction that uses
extrinsic evidence to help determine the generally accepted meaning that
disputed claim terms held for ordinarily skilled artisans at the time of
invention, and largely sticks with that definition unless the context offers
a compelling reason to depart from it.
So, while courts will doubtlessly decide some future cases based on
idiosyncratic definitions that courts derive from patent specifications,
because of the incentives provided by Teva, as time passes, more cases
will likely involve factual findings that play an influential “role in a
judge’s ultimate legal conclusion.”112
III. THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF TEVA
The changes to the methodology of claim construction encouraged by
Teva are likely, generally, to be positive. By anchoring claim meaning in
objective evidence and following an established process for evaluating
claim terms, the methodology should result in more predictability in
litigation-driven claim construction, better drafted patent claims in the
longer term, and ultimately, a patent law that more finely tunes the system
of incentives it is supposed to regulate. These are all changes that, if
realized, should be welcomed by the patent system, most of its
participants, and the public.
The methodology encouraged by Teva is likely to result in more
predictability in litigation-driven claim construction. A central
justification for this argument is the observation that the methodology
109. In still other cases, a judge might reach the conclusion that it is efficient to attempt an
intrinsic-evidence-only claim construction. The Federal Circuit affirms the overwhelming
majority of district court claim constructions as it is, so it could make sense to proceed this way
when the costs of the relevant evidentiary hearings are taken into account.
110. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1331 (2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 1330.
112. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
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anchors ultimate determinations of claim construction to an objective
assessment of extrinsic evidence concerning the meaning a term would
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
The question of the meaning of a term to a skilled artisan at the time of
invention is most readily conceptualized as a question of historical fact.
The determination of historical fact is precisely the sort of question that
our legal system traditionally imagines is most reliably and accurately
answered by the adversarial presentation of evidence. If this traditional
view is correct, it follows that the meaning of a term at the time of
invention should, generally, be more reliably and accurately determined
when claim analysis is anchored to an objective assessment of extrinsic
evidence than it will be by an alternative that relies upon judicial selection
from a range of patent idiosyncratic definitions without any resort to
extrinsic evidence. This might be especially so when the judicial choice
is constrained (largely) to patent idiosyncratic definitions developed by
talented lawyers years after a patent has issued, to serve the purposes of
litigation, and when the only guide for the court is the same intrinsic
evidence the parties have used to support their conflicting definitions.
While the post-Teva mode of claim construction also requires an
analysis of how a claim term is used “in the context of the specific patent
claim under review,”113 that analysis may now often be undertaken with
the meaning the claim term generally had to a person of skill in the art at
the time of the invention as something of a starting point. As reasons for
choosing between extrinsic evidence-supported meanings and intrinsic
evidence-supported meanings develop, ultimate determinations could
well become even more predictable, both at the district court, and on
appeal.
Should this speculation be correct, the greater predictability that
results from the use of the Teva-encouraged methodology could have the
beneficial effect of discouraging some lawsuits, because both parties will
have better information about infringement and liability. And even where
lawsuits have been initiated, they might come to a quicker, and therefore
often cheaper, close.
The methodology encouraged by Teva is ultimately likely to
encourage better-drafted patent claims. This argument builds upon the
possibility of an increase in predictability. To the extent the methodology
encouraged by Teva leads to greater predictability in the determination of
the meaning of patent claims, there are at least two likely consequences.
First, patent applicants will need to be warier than they presently are
about overclaiming. Applicants who use technical terms of broad or
vague meaning can, after Teva, more reliably expect to be held to the full
scope of that language in patent litigation. This should encourage the
113. Id.
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judicious use of limiting language to cabin or more precisely define terms
that would under some interpretations render a patent claim invalid.
Second, the greater predictability that may follow from the methodology
encouraged by Teva offers patent applicants the possibility of greater
certainty in the value of their patents. This is so because the methodology
Teva encourages, with its focus on the line between extrinsic and intrinsic
evidence and how extrinsic evidence should be understood within the
context of the patent, should ultimately produce a jurisprudence that
teaches patent applicants how to claim in a way that reliably provides the
rights they are seeking—subject, of course, to what the prior art allows.
The methodology encouraged by Teva may help patent law more
finely tune the incentive structure of the patent system. By conventional
accounts, the patent system is supposed to “promote the progress of
science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to . . . inventors
the exclusive right to their respective . . . discoveries.”114 In other words,
the purpose of granting exclusive rights to inventors is to secure public
benefits. Broadly speaking, the public benefits involved are
advancements in science and technology, and patent law secures these
benefits by granting an “exclusive right” that creates an opportunity for
inventors to recoup the costs undertaken to bestow the benefits upon the
public, and beyond that, to profit.
An optimal patent system balances the costs of exclusive rights with
the benefits the granting of those rights confers on the public, and tries to
maximize the difference. Accomplishing this task is commonly
understood to be the job of patent law.
The argument made here is simple. Given the choice between a patent
law that produces a larger number of spurious claim constructions, and a
patent law that produces a smaller number of spurious claim
constructions, the patent law that produces the smaller number of
spurious claim constructions more finely tunes the incentive structure.
To be clear, the argument is not that the difference between the costs
and benefits of granting exclusive rights would be optimized if the current
patent law were unerringly applied. The argument is merely that a patent
system that more reliably and accurately predicts the scope of a patent’s
exclusive right more effectively regulates the patent system’s incentive
structure than does a system that less reliably and less accurately predicts
the scope of the patent’s exclusive right.
This Article began by explaining how claim construction is central to
patent law’s efforts to balance private rights with public interests.
Incorporating all that was said there about how claim construction is
central to the operation of nearly all patent doctrines, it requires little
more to point out that when claim construction is more predictable, all
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the other levers of patent law—those that must work well for the costs
and benefits of the law to be properly felt—are more likely to be effective.
CONCLUSION
This Article has closely examined the Teva holding and attempted to
situate it within modern claim construction jurisprudence. The analysis
has resulted in the novel thesis that Teva is likely to have a heretofore
unforeseen and substantial impact on the methodology of patent claim
construction. Moreover, this Article speculates that the Teva-encouraged
changes to claim construction methodology are generally positive for the
patent system because they should encourage a patent law that more
finely tunes the system of incentives it is supposed to regulate.

